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Does Informal Finance Help Formal Finance? Evidence 
from Third Party Loan Guarantees in China 
 
ABSTRACT 
Building on the important study by Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) and Ayyagari, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010), we examine whether third party guarantors play 
an effective role in assessing loan risk. Using a proprietary database of third party loan 
guarantees in China, we find strong evidence that guarantors and banks disagree on 
pricing loan risk, and that banks can better predict loan defaults than guarantors. We also 
find that the probability of loan default is affected by the capability of guarantor officers. 
Our findings question the contribution of soft information in the improvement of credit 
scoring and support the view that informal finance should be limited. This paper also 
supports the implications of studies on human capital in financial intermediation. 
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Does Informal Finance Help Formal Finance? Evidence from Third 
Party Loan Guarantees in China 
 
I. Introduction 
      Bank lending to small and medium enterprises is attracting attention from both 
researchers and practitioners. China’s economy is populated with a very large number of 
small and medium enterprises, which contribute substantially to its national economy 
(Chong, Lu and Ongena, 2010). While existing literature is showing that many of the 
state-owned banks’ loans were originated to state-owned enterprises (Chang, Liao, Yu 
and Ni, 2010).  A large number of small private firms in China are faced with difficulties 
of obtaining bank loans. Under these circumstances, the third party guarantor is playing a 
key role bridging small borrowers and banks. Third party loan guarantee business has 
grown to be a competitive market in China. However, as an important form of alternative 
financing channel, guaranteed loans are rarely discussed in literature. Few studies have 
discussed the role played by guarantors in assessing loan risk and the information 
collection and transmission in the lending process.  
      A strand of literature shows the existence of informal finance alongside formal 
systems. Recent work by Tsai (2002), Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), and Linton (2006) 
argue that private sector firms in China rely on alternative financing and governance 
mechanisms. It is the informal finance that contributes to the fast growing of private 
sectors. However, Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010) provides counter 
evidence that firms with formal financing channels grow faster than those with alternative 
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finance. Their findings question whether reputation and relationship-based financing is 
responsible for the performance of the fastest-growing firms in developing countries.  
     In this article we use detailed third party guaranteed loan data on small firms in China 
to investigate which of the two views are consistent with the operation of the informal 
sector in China. Specifically, in a setting with information asymmetry among borrower, 
guarantors and banks, do banks agree with guarantors in pricing loan risk? Who is better 
able to predict the probability of loan default, the guarantor or the bank? To answer these 
questions, we first investigate how loan rates are correlated with rates of guarantee fee. 
Next, we explore the determinants of rates of guarantee fee and guaranteed amount. We 
then study whether loan rates and rates of guarantee fee have predictive power on loan 
default. Finally, we examine whether guarantors and banks use the same sources of 
information when assessing borrower credit quality.             
      The dataset we use covers third party guaranteed loans from 2006 to the first half of 
2009. The advantage of this dataset is its coverage of Chinese small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). In addition to financial information and loan characteristics of 
borrowers, the dataset also includes private information collected by guarantors, as well 
as guarantor officers’ characteristics. These merits of the dataset allow me to investigate 
various factors affecting loan pricing and probability of loan default.  
       Using rates of guarantee fee and loan rates as the measure of information used by 
guarantors and banks respectively, we find that guarantors and banks disagree on the 
pricing of loans. Specifically, higher loan rates set by banks negatively correlate to lower 
default probability measure given by the guarantor. This result suggests guarantors and 
banks rely on different information in assessing borrower’s risk. With the responsibility 
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to recover major loss when borrowers default on loans, guarantors have incentives to 
explore as much information about borrowers operation and credit quality as they can, 
while banks mainly rely on accounting data reported by borrowers and public information 
provided by rating agencies.  
       Our results also show that loan rates have predictability of loan default, while rates of 
guarantee fee do not. This finding is supported by the probit regression results for default 
prediction. These results remain robust after controlling for fixed year and industry 
effects. As suggested by Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011) that decentralized, small 
banks have a comparative advantage in the production of soft information because soft 
information is costly to acquire and difficult to transmit to others, we expect the 
guarantor is in a better position to collect soft information about borrowers, since 
guarantors are small private firms compared with lending banks. Another interesting 
finding is that the probability of loan default is affected by capability of guarantor 
officers. This result sheds light on the importance of human capital for financial sectors1.  
      The dominant view on the role of soft information in bank lending literature is that it 
is the soft information component that contributes to the improvement of credit 
assessment (Chang, Liao, Yu and Ni, 2010). Qian, Strahan and Yang (2010) also find that 
soft information has a more pronounced effect relative to publicly available information 
when banks make lending decisions. If similar results hold in the cases where loans are 
guaranteed by a third party guarantor, we should expect guarantors can predict loan 
default more precisely because guarantors have greater incentives to explore private 
information about the borrowers. However, the empirical results question the importance 
of soft information in pricing loans.  
                                                  
1 See, for example, Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2010), Bellucci, Borisov, and Zazzaro (2010).  
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       We further examine the information content of rates of guarantee fee, default 
probability measure and loan rates. Empirical results indicate that guarantors incorporate 
soft information when making guarantee decisions, while banks rely more on public 
information and ratings. We also find evidence that it is the additional part of information 
banks have than guarantors that contributes to the predictability of loan default.  A 
possible explanation is that although guarantors have advantage over banks in terms of 
analyzing borrowers’ credit risk by utilizing soft information, banks may have 
overwhelming advantage in collecting and analyzing hard information about borrowers.  
      Overall, our findings are consistent with implications of literature questioning the 
contribution of informal financing in China. Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2010) found bank financing, or formal financing is associated with faster growth. The 
existence of guarantors is also a special form of intermediation adapted to the poor 
finance and law environment in developing economies such as China. We doubt whether 
guarantors serve as an efficient supplement to the formal banking system.   
      This work may contribute to literature in the following senses: First, it analyzes the 
role of third party loan guarantor in bridging small borrower and banks; second, it 
provides both theoretical and empirical analysis of information asymmetry among all 
participants in the lending process. Results in this article is based on first-hand data on 
guaranteed loans in China, and have policy implications that informal finance needs to be 
regulated and limited.   
      The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the practice of bank 
lending in China and theoretical background, as well as hypothesis development; Section 
III describes the data and sample characteristics; Section IV presents empirical results on 
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disagreement between guarantors and banks; Section V analyzes the prediction of loan 
default; Section VI explores the information content of rates of guarantee fee and loan 
rates; Section VII concludes.  
 
 
II. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
 
A. Third Party Loan Guarantee 
       China’s banking sector has been the primary source of financing for China’s growing 
economy, with the banking and credit industry accounting for over 80 percent of China’s 
financial assets (Bailey et al., 2010). According to the website of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, in 2009 the GDP grew by 8.7 percent and reached RMB 33.5 
trillion, while the outstanding balance of loans made by banking institutions increase by 
RMB 10.5 trillion or 33.0 percent year-on-year to RMB 42.6 trillion. Total bank loans 
comprised 127.16% of GDP.  With bank loans accounting for 87% of total funds raised 
by China’s non-financial sector as of June 2006, bank lending remains the dominant 
source of financing in China’s economy (Bailey et al., 2010).  
       As of end-2009, China’ banking sector comprises 2 policy banks and China 
Development Bank (CDB), 5 large commercial banks (Agriculture Bank of China, Bank 
of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Bank 
of Communications), 12 joint-stock commercial banks, 143 city commercial banks, 43 
rural commercial banks, and other forms of banking institutions. The four largest, state-
owned commercial banks have nation-wide networks of branches and control the 
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majority of assets in the banking system, although their dominant status has been 
weakened in recent years, with the gradual opening of China banking system as a result 
of China’s entrance to WTO in 2001 (Qian et al., 2010).  
       To introduce competition among banks and improve the banking sector’s efficiency, 
China opened its domestic currency (RMB) business to all foreign banks by 2006. The 
“big four”, along with join-stock banks and foreign banks are sharing the majority of 
banking business. However, the “big four” are still accounting for overwhelming 
proportion in terms of both asset scale as well as loan size. Many of the state-owned 
banks’ loans were originated to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based on political and 
policy considerations (Chang et al., 2010). Bank lending continues to be driven by the 
availability of funds, not borrower profitability (Bailey et al., 2010). A large number of 
small enterprises are still facing difficulties in obtaining bank loans. Recognizing the 
obstacles that small enterprises are faced with, the Chinese government raised this issue 
to the national development agenda which resulted in the “Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) Promotion Law” in 2003. However, small firms financing difficulties persist. 
Chong et al. (2010) reported the 2005 survey results that among the SMEs owners that 
responded, 79.5% of them rated financing environment as “not change” or 
“deteriorating” compared with the years prior to 2005.  
      For small firms which can not obtain loans directly from a bank, they probably would 
need to find a guarantor to provide loan guarantee to them. In this case, the guarantor is 
taking over part of the certification role played by banks. 
      The guarantor plays a key role in the lending process. Since its business depends on 
how precisely it can predict loan defaults, it has an incentive to investigate these 
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borrowers and get as much useful information as they can. Although we use a propriety 
database owned by one Chinese guarantee company, the basic principles and evaluating 
process it adopts would not differ much across different guarantors, since they are 
operating according to uniform laws and regulations. When evaluating a guarantee 
application, a guarantor officer would give two scores: the qualitative score, based on the 
officer’s subjective judgment of the borrower’s market power, competitiveness, credit 
worthiness, etc; the quantitative score, calculated by a formula with accounting data as 
major inputs. Then, combined with loan information, including amount of loan applied 
for, term of loan and value of collateral, the officer would then compute an overall 
default probability measure.  The default probability measure is mapped to certain level 
of rate of guarantee fee. Normally, a higher default probability measure corresponds to 
higher rate of guarantee fee. After a guarantee application is approved by the guarantor, 
the lending bank would decide a loan rate based on its judge on the loan quality. While 
the lending bank may or may not take the rate of guarantee fee into consideration when 
deciding the loan rate, the guarantor would not adjust its pricing of the loan guarantee2.  
      In my dataset, there are zero rates of guarantee fee in some cases. I exclude theses 
cases in the major analysis since they refer to special government-funded projects, which 
are different from most of the cases. This paper mainly focuses on the cases where the 
source of funds is commercial banks.  
 
B. Theoretical Framework 
                                                  
2 In practice, there are few cases where borrowers reject bank loans because of high loan rates. This rules 
out the possibilities that any conflicts in the pricing by guarantors and banks are due to borrowers with high 
loan rates dropping out of the sample.  
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      An important role of financial intermediary is to mitigate problems such as 
transaction costs, information asymmetries and agency conflicts. Literature has 
recognized the superior ability of banks in acquiring information or knowledge beyond 
that which is available to ordinary financial market participants (e.g., Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor 1984, Diamond 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986, and Dow and Gorton 1997). 
When banks and prospective borrowers are independent and profit-maximizing, banks 
would serve to generate information and play the certification role in issuing debt. 
However, as suggested by Bailey et al. (2010), the poor state of law, regulation, and 
discloser in China’s capital market is a severe constraint on the efficiency of banks and 
borrowers. Moreover, interest rates on bank loans are regulated by the government and 
are not effectively linked to borrower credit ratings. Under theses circumstances, the 
signaling value of bank loans is no longer obvious.  
      In small firms’ borrowings, the content of loan rates is mainly composed of hard 
information since it is the guarantor that has the incentive to exert efforts and improve the 
accuracy of credit ratings. In China, most guarantors are private firms rather than a 
division of lending banks. Guarantee fee is the major source of income of guarantors. It 
pursues the goal of profit-maximization by minimizing the payments for default loans. 
Therefore, guarantors have incentives to collect all types of information about borrowers, 
such as the number of shareholders, whether the firm managers have a political 
background, etc. to help the scoring process. In this sense, guarantors have superior soft 
information about borrowers. I am interested in asking, does guarantors’ soft information 
really help in predicting loan defaults? Objectively, guarantors would score borrowers 
and price guaranteed loans solely based on its default probability measure. However, in 
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real business setting, guarantee applications are processed by individual guarantor 
officers. Conflicts of interest between individual guarantor officers’ pursuing personal 
benefits and realizing the firm’s profit-maximization goal can arise. This issue can 
potentially affect guarantors’ evaluation of borrowers’ credit condition. 
      On the banks’ side, there are a number of empirical studies linking bank’s 
information to loan default prediction. Do banks rely on the information provided by 
guarantors? In 2004 Chinese banks started to implement an internal credit rating system. 
Chang et al. (2010) suggested that internal credit ratings are significantly related to the 
commonly used firm-specific financial factors in predictable ways. They found that while 
bank’s internal credit ratings largely subsume firm-specific hard information, it is the soft 
information component of these ratings that contributes to the improvement in assessing 
credit quality. Qian et al. (2010) also suggested that with a series of reforms implemented 
in banking sector in China, loan officers have stronger incentives to produce high-quality 
soft information. An increasing number of studies show that banks are using more soft 
information nowadays. However, in the cases where guarantors take over the role of 
investigating and screening borrowers, do banks still have incentives to collect soft 
information? To what extent does soft information owned by guarantors contributes to 
the assessment of loan risks? This paper aims to address these questions. Given that the 
information content of loan rates and rates of guarantee fee can be different, I expect they 
would lead to different prediction of loan defaults.  
       The potential asymmetric information problems in the lending process are as follows: 
first, Borrowers have incentives to lie, for example, to manipulate accounting information 
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or to hide bad information from both guarantor and banks3; second, guarantors have 
incentives to hide good information from banks, or it will lose good business; third, banks 
have incentives to hide bad information from the guarantor. Since banks do not take the 
cost of default, it only cares about the interest income from loans. 
      A number of studies have been discussing information asymmetry in bank lending. 
Mankiw (1986) analyzed the inefficiency in allocation of credit because borrowers have 
greater information concerning their own riskiness than do lender. Although the 
asymmetry always exists, banks may gain an information advantage that allows them to 
impose higher interest rates by monitoring borrowers, argued by Rajan (1992). However, 
there is little literature discussing information asymmetry between borrowers and 
guarantors.  
      This section contains a simple model between a borrower and a guarantor. The firm 
desires a loan for its investment project, and is maximizing net amount of loan. The 
guarantor has to measure the riskiness of the loan and to decide whether to provide 
guarantee to the loan and the rate of guarantee fee. Once the guarantee application of the 
firm is submitted, the banker (a loan officer) will examine the creditworthiness of the 
borrower and decide upon a loan rate to charge.  
       Assume there are two types of borrowers: good and bad. Denote the probability of a 
good borrower occurring with P. Let bg RandR  denote the guarantee rate and loan rate, 
respectively. Based on the above analysis, the borrower’s problem can be expressed as 
follows:  
                                                  
3 In our sample, we find cases where the borrower exaggerates its book value of shareholder equity and 
defaults on its loan. The empirical test for the hypothesis that borrowers have incentives to lie is presented 
in Section III.  
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)1(max bg RRL   , 
where L stands for the amount of guarantee it applies for. For simplicity, assume the loan 
size never changes during the whole lending process. That is, the guarantor can only 
accept or reject a guarantee application, but can not change the amount of guarantee.  
       Given the guarantee application process in practice, information about the borrower 
comes from the investigation of the guarantor officer. It consists of public information 
such as accounting data reported by the borrower, private information such as number of 
shareholders and managers’ political background, and subjective scoring of the 
borrowers’ overall operation and creditworthiness by the loan officer. Let I denote the set 
of information the guarantor can get access to. With the incentive to get as much as net 
amount of loan, a bad borrower may have incentives to manipulate the information it 
provides, or, it has an incentive to lie. Let   denote the probability that a bad borrower 
lying. In the investigation of the borrower, a guarantor may or may not detect the liar. 
Assume the guarantor can correctly judge the borrower’s type with a probability of  . 
Since it is assumed that only bad borrowers would lie and the guarantor only lend to good 
borrowers, a guarantee application would be rejected once the guarantor finds that the 
borrower is lying. Let )(P  denote the probability that the guarantor observes a good 
type borrower. The profit-maximization problem of the guarantor has the following 
expression:  
})](1[)({max LpLRpEimize g   , 
where  )1)(1()(  ppp ,  is a function of  .  
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       Differentiating the first-order condition with respect to  and  , respectively, for 
the borrower’s problem and the guarantor’s problem4, we obtain that (1) 

 gR >0  and (2) 
0




. The key variable   is affected by the expertise and information gathering 
ability of the guarantor. Information learning by guarantors from banks can improve the 
guarantor’s ability to correctly judge on the borrowers’ type5. If the guarantor is better 
able to judge borrowers’ quality, borrower would have less incentive to lie, thus 
information asymmetry can be mitigated. Lower incentives to lie would benefit 
borrowers in the sense that it would reduce the average guarantee fee to be charged. On 
the guarantor’s side, the less asymmetric information there is between it and the 
borrowers, the more precise its default prediction would be.  
 
C. Hypothesis Development 
       The above framework suggests both guarantors and banks may make mistakes in 
predicting loan prospects. It gives rise to two sets of empirical predictions. The first is 
related to the possible disagreement between banks and guarantors on risk assessment.  
      Hypothesis1. Guarantors and banks may price loans differently based on different on 
sources of information they have.  
                                                  
4 It can be shown that 0
)(
)(
):( 













gRP
P
gR
FOC  and 
0)1)(1()1)(1()(:)( 











 pRpRpFOC gg  
5 Here we implicitly assume that banks hold incomplete but true information about borrowers. This 
assumption is realistic regarding banks mainly rely on the internal credit system when judging a borrower. 
Information from this system is objective since firms can hardly manipulate its borrowing and payment 
history.  
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Under hypothesis1, loan rates or rates of guarantee fee have implications for how the 
borrower is likely to default on loans. 
      Hypothesis2a. Higher loan rates predict higher probability of loan defaults. 
      Hypothesis2b. Higher rates of guarantee fee predict higher probability of loan 
defaults.  
      In the first set of tests, I investigate how the guarantor determines the rate of 
guarantee fee for different borrowers. If the guarantor relies more on soft information 
when pricing a guarantee, soft information should play a more prominent role in 
estimating default probability. If there are conflicts of interest between individual 
guarantor officers and the whole guarantor as a firm, we should expect officer 
characteristics affect default probability measure. We also examine what factors affect 
the amount of guarantee loans. We are particularly interested to see how and to what 
extent the guarantor’s soft information would affect final approved loan amount. Next, 
we explore the how the loan rates correlate to guarantor’s information and loan 
characteristics. If banks and guarantors have the same information about borrowers, we 
should expect positive correlation between loan rates and the rate of guarantee fee. Next 
we investigate who can predict loan default correctly, guarantors or banks. I use the loan 
rate and the rate of guarantee fee to measure information owned by banks and guarantors, 
respectively. Finally, I examine the information content of loan rates and rates of 
guarantee fee. If guarantors make guarantee decision mainly on based on soft information 
it collects from borrowers, and banks determine loan rates based on hard information 
such as borrowers’ accounting information, while loan rates are more correlated with that.    
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III. Data and Sample Characteristics 
 
A. Loan Guarantee Market in China 
       Lending banks in developed countries usually take the certification and monitoring 
roles. In a few cases, the guarantor’s role is played by certain government sectors. In the 
U.S., the Small Business Administration (SBA) acts as a guarantor on bank loans. The 
SBA does not make loans directly to small businesses but does help to educate and 
prepare the business owner to apply for a loan through a financial institution or bank. In 
U.K., The Small Firms Loan Guarantee (SFLG) played as the loan guarantee for small 
business from 1981 to January 2009. The SFLG was replaced by the Enterprise Finance 
Guarantee on 14 January 2009. In HK, the HKSAR Special Loan Guarantee Scheme 
aims to help enterprises secure loans from participating lending institutions for meeting 
general business needs to tide over the liquidity problem during the global financial crisis 
with the government acting as the guarantor. 
       The primary use of the guarantee programs in the U.S. or in U.K. is to make loans for 
longer repayment periods based in part upon looser underwriting criteria than normal 
commercial business loans. In contrast, the guarantee business has become a profitable 
but risky sector in China. Guarantors are taking over the screening job in making loans to 
SMEs. In China, state-owned banks usually prefer providing loans to state-owned firms, 
which are often very large firms, and show much less interest in small business financing. 
Under these circumstances, guarantors find opportunities to enter Chinese bank loan 
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market. With expertise in investigating borrowers’ business and evaluating their credit 
condition, guarantors can make profits by charging guarantee fee. The guarantee industry 
has been developing rapidly in China. By the end of year 2008, there are 4247 guarantee 
firms in total, providing RMB 1.75 trillion of guarantee to SMEs. 
 
B. Sample Description 
       The dataset I use cover third party loan guarantee to small and medium firms in 
China. The dataset contains all loan guarantee issued by the guarantor from 2006 to the 
first half of 2009. There are 1076 loan guarantees in our final sample. It covers various 
industries such as manufacturing, service, wholesale, construction, etc. The majority of 
the borrowers are privately owned.  Except for only a few cases where the loan maturity 
is two years, most loans in our dataset have maturity of one year.  
       For each loan guarantee application, the dataset contains information on its applied 
amount, approved amount, value of collateral, and whether the borrower defaults on its 
loan. The dataset is suited for my purposes for several reasons. First, it provides credit 
scores and a default probability measure of borrowing firms. The information helps us 
understand borrowers’ credit condition from the guarantor’s view. Second, it provides 
private information about the borrowers, which can not be easily obtained by other 
institutions. For example, it reports information such as whether the managers’ relatives 
work for the firm, the number of shareholders, and whether these shareholders have a 
political background, loan history, guarantee history, etc. Studies about soft information 
usually use estimates from regression or other indirect proxies to measure soft 
information, while this dataset gives direct, easy-to-use measures. Finally, it has 
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comprehensive accounting data of borrowers. For most borrowing firms, it provides only 
two consecutive years’ accounting data. The available accounting period might not 
overlap with the guarantee application year, so our final sample reduced to 660 after 
including accounting data.  
       Table I describes the distribution of loan guarantees by year and by lending banks. 
The guarantor issued largest number of guarantees in 2007, with the highest default rate 
of 3.33%. We define a default if the borrower fails to pay in any month during the 
repayment period. In our sample, 16 out of 1076 loans are defined as default. The average 
default rate throughout 2006 to 2009 is 1.47%. According to our general knowledge of 
the guarantee business, the default rate is below the industry average. There are 860, or 
79.93% loans issued by non-state-owned banks. The largest issuer, Shenzhen Ping An 
Bank, issued 454 loans, representing 42.19% of all sample loans.  
       Panel A of Table II reports borrower characteristics. The average total asset of 
borrowers is RMB 7.07 million, and the average revenue is RMB 98.60 million. 
Combining all available information about a borrower, the guarantor would give a default 
probability measure, ranging from 0 to 1. The guarantor perceives a measure below 0.4 as 
low risky, 0.4 to 0.6 as medium, and above 0.6 as high risky.  The mean of the default 
probability measure is 0.497. We also examine the correlation between the rate of 
guarantee fee, default probability measure and accounting variables. Consistent with our 
expectation, higher default probability measure leads to higher rate of guarantee fee. We 
learnt from the correlation table that guarantor officer would give a higher score to 
borrowers with larger size and higher profitability, measured by ROA.  
 
18 
IV. Loan Pricing by Banks and Guarantors 
 
        In this section, I study how guarantors determine the rate of guarantee fee and 
guaranteed amount. The focus of this section is the disagreement between banks and 
guarantors in pricing loans.  
A. Rate of Guarantee Fee and Guaranteed Amount 
       To explore how the guarantor determines the rate of guarantee fee for each loan, I 
assume the rate of guarantee fee can be presented as follows:  
 
)1(Pr' 54
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where the I subscripts indicate loan applications. DPM refers to the default probability 
measure of borrower i given by the guarantor. Guarantor Characteristics refers to the 
guarantor officer’s personal information. I deleted the observations where the guarantee 
fee equals to zero, since these loans are granted by governments and different in nature 
from other loans. The regression results are reported in table III.  
       In table III, the most important finding is that the rate of guarantee fee is mainly 
determined by the default probability measure of the borrower. As can be in the table, the 
coefficients of DPM are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all model 
specifications, suggesting that higher DMP leads to higher guarantee fee. On average, 
one percent increase of DPM would results in 33 basis points in crease in rate of 
guarantee fee. The coefficients of Firm Age are negative and statistically significant at 
1% or 5% level, indicating that the guarantor charges lower fee from older firms. An 
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interesting result is that the coefficients of the credit rating measure – Rating – are 
positive and significant, suggesting that the guarantor charge a higher guarantee fee from 
borrowers with a rating than those without. This result may reveal the different opinions 
about borrowers’ credit condition held by the guarantor and rating agency.  
 
I also explored the determinants of the guaranteed amount. The model can be expressed 
as follows:  
 
)2(Pr' 543
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       The empirical results are presented in Table IV. Table IV shows that a major 
determinant of guaranteed amount of loan is the DPM, as indicated by the negative and 
significant coefficients of DPM in model 2 and model 3. These results also suggest that 
the final approved amount largely depends on the original amount applied for. The 
guarantor may increase or reduce the guaranteed amount according to DPM. 1% increase 
in DPM will result in RMB 6200 reduction in guaranteed amount. In contrast, the 
coefficient of DPM in model 1 is significantly positive, suggesting that the larger size a 
loan has, the higher DPM would be given by the guarantor.  
 
B. Disagreement on Loan Pricing between Guarantor and Banks 
       I begin the analysis of information asymmetry between the guarantor and banks by 
examining how loan rates are correlated with other factors. The results are presented in 
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Table V. The variable in interest is DPM. Variables describing bank characteristics, loan 
characteristics and soft information about borrowers also enter as robustness check.  
       In this table, the most important results are the coefficients of DPM. The terms in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates are standard errors. Throughout, we see that 
loan rates are negatively correlated with DPM, suggesting the guarantor and banks give 
different evaluation on loan risk. In practice, the guarantor scores borrowers according to 
accounting information, as well as by investigating the borrowing firm in person and 
collecting all kinds of information about competitiveness, manager ability and 
shareholder background, etc. Guarantors usually do not share its private information 
about the borrowers with banks, while banks have their own internal system recording 
firms’ loan history. Disagreement about borrowers’ risk can be partly due to different 
information sources guarantors and banks rely on. Besides, both guarantor officers and 
loan officers make guarantee or loan decisions with certain discretion (Cerqueiro et al., 
2010). It is suggested in many studies that hard information, such as accounting data, can 
be easily manipulated by Chinese firms. Under these circumstances, it is likely that 
guarantors and banks have different interpretation of borrowers’ information and give 
conflicting prediction of loan default probability.  
       Another result worth noting is the higher loan rates in crisis period. We define the 
period between July 2007 and June 2009 as the crisis period. For all specifications, the 
coefficients of crisis dummy are positive and significant. This finding is supported by 
Santos and  
Winton (2008), which argues that banks would be able to raise loan rates during 
recessions, when firms are typically in greater risk of failure, because banks have an 
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exploitable information advantage which can lead to hold-up problem for borrowers. My 
result is consistent with the finding that the information hold-up effects are stronger 
during crisis period.  
       How the loan amount is associated with loan rate is also studied. Following 
Cerqueiro et al. (2010), which provides evidence that banks use discretion when pricing 
loans and the level of discretion decreases in the size of loan, I anticipate that the 
borrowers in my sample also face with the discretion problem. Therefore, I adopted the 
maximum likelihood estimation in regressing loan rates on loan size.  I obtain estimates 
by maximizing the following log-likelihood function with respect to   and   :  
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In this model, iy  is the dependent variable, iX  a vector of explanatory variables in the 
mean equation, and iZ a vector of explanatory variables in the variable equation.  
       The positive and significant coefficients of loan size across all specifications indicate 
that banks charge higher interest rate to large amount borrowers. Santos and Winton 
(2008) provides evidence that bank-dependent borrowers, or borrowers with less access 
to public bond markets, are facing higher bank loan rates. It is likely that firms applying 
for larger amount of loan are more dependent on bank loans as financing channel. One 
may argue that large amount borrowers are more likely to be large in size and may find it 
easier to get access to public bond market, however, considering the poor development of 
financial markets and institutional environment in China, small firms largely depend on 
bank loans. The ease of access to public bond market has little effect in this case. I notice 
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that this result is opposite to Cerqueiro et al. (2010), which concluded that the level of 
loan rates decrease in the size of the loan. They explain the results mainly from search 
costs perspective. This argument would be irrelevant for my analysis on Chinese small 
borrowers.   
 
V. Prediction of Loan Defaults 
 
       The results so far demonstrate that guarantors and banks for different view in pricing 
loans. This section further provides evidence that loans rates have predictive power on 
loan defaults. Banks are found to be more effective in loan pricing.  
 
A. Loan Rates  and Prediction of Loan Default 
 
      To explore the factors that may contribute in predicting loan default, we employ the 
following probit regressions: 
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       In this specification, default is the dummy variable which takes the value of one if 
the loan defaults, and zero otherwise. The empirical results are presented in Table VI.  
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       Table VI shows that the default probability measure alone does not have predictive 
power for loan default. In contrast, the coefficients of loan rates and All Information, the 
measure of information sharing, are significant at 5% level in all model specifications, 
suggesting that banks are more effective in pricing loan risks. A further interpretation is 
guarantors may improve their default prediction by learning information from banks. This 
result echoes the findings by Barth et al. (2009), who finds that private bureaus play an 
effective role in reducing the information gap between lenders and borrowers, and 
consequently corruption in lending. Guarantors’ information mainly comes from its 
investigation of borrowers, while banks basically rely on the internal credit rating history. 
Intuitively, aggregating different sources of information would result in better 
understanding of borrowers’ creditworthiness. Overall, the result strongly supports our 
Hypothesis2a that banks are pricing loans more effectively.  
       In column 2, we explore whether borrowers with a guarantee history makes a 
difference in default prediction. The dummy Guaranty History takes the value of one if 
the borrower was offered a loan guarantee by the same guarantor before. The coefficients 
across all specifications are negative and significant, indicating borrowers with a 
guarantee history are less likely to default. As discussed earlier, this is probability due to 
the increasing knowledge about the borrowers accumulated by the guarantor during 
previous business However, the significance is reduced with other factors entering the 
regression.  
       The age of borrowing firm is also included in the regression. The coefficient of age 
is negative and significant. Existing studies usually incorporate firm size, profitability 
and loan characteristics as independent variables in default prediction models, while few 
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of them have considered firm age. Older firms tend to be large, mature firms. It is 
reasonable to expect that they are less like to default on loans.  
 
B.  The Role of Guarantor Officer 
       A worth-noting variable in Table VI is the capability measure of guarantor officers, 
Low Capability. We measure guarantor officer’s capability with the number of working 
years by the year when a loan guarantee is processed by her. In practice, the average 
number of working years until promotion for a guarantor officer is 3-5 years. We regard 
working years longer than 8 years as an indicator of low capability. Low capability of 
guarantor officers is positively associated with default probability.  
       A number of studies provide evidence that financial intermediaries involve 
processing soft information 6 . Specifically, Qian et al. (2010) provides evidence that 
decentralization in bank system can provides stronger incentives for individual loan 
officers to produce soft information. Therefore, the personal characteristics of the loan 
officer/guarantor officer can have an effect on quality of loans granted. Focarelli and 
Panetta (2003) pointed out that human capital is especially important for financial 
services and hi-tech industries. Bellucci et al. (2010) argues that gender of loan officer 
and borrower can both play a role in bank-firm relationships. Bottazzi et al. (2008) 
provides evidence for the importance of human capital for venture capital firms. The 
most relevant one is Berger and Udell (2004), which finds that an easing of credit 
standards is resulted from the deterioration in the ability of loan officers. In our study, it 
is the guarantor officers that are producing a large amount of soft information, thus the 
ability of a guarantor officer can be associated with potential loan problems. We therefore 
                                                  
6 See, for example, Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thyakor (1984), or Allen (1990). 
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expect the loan guarantees granted by a loan guarantor officer with lower capability are 
more likely to default. The results strongly support this expectation.  
 
 
VI. Information Content of Loan Rates and Rate of Guarantee Fee 
 
       The results so far demonstrate that loan rates have predictive power on loan defaults. 
This section further explores the information content of loan rates and rates of guarantee 
fee. Evidence presented in this section shows that banks rely more on hard information in 
setting loan rates, and it is the additional part of information owned by banks than 
guarantors that contributes to default prediction.   
 
A.  Information Content of Rate of Guarantee Fee, Default Probability Measure and 
Loan Rate 
       I further examine the information content of loan rates, guarantee fee and default 
probability measure. The results are presented in table IX. The first column reveals 
factors affecting the price of loan guarantees. Borrowers with larger size are charged 
lower fee by both guarantors and banks. Regarding the possibility that the rate of 
guarantee fee has little variation and contains only part of information7, I conduct a 
similar regression of the Default Probability Measure. It is positively correlated with 
leverage and negatively correlated with ROA and asset turnover. Borrowers whose 
manager has a political background receives lower default probability measure, 
                                                  
7 I would like to thank Prof. Frank M. Song for suggestions on this point. Since the rate of guarantee fee is 
mainly determined by the Default Probability Measure, which is calculated by transforming the credit score 
given by guarantor officers, I mainly use Default Probability Measure as the guarantors’ pricing of loans.  
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suggesting that guarantors are using some private and soft information in assessing 
borrower risks. Although we incorporate Guarantor’s Private Information into the 
specifications, we should expect there are other unobservable variables affecting 
guarantor officers’ perspective. 
        Determinants of loan rates are different. It is largely affected by Book Value of 
Shareholder Equity and Rating. Both of these two variables represent public information 
about borrowers. Inferring from both empirical results and discussions with guarantor 
officer 8 , it is the guarantors that investigate borrowing firms’ operation and credit 
condition. Banks mainly rely on public information and credit records.  
       It is worth noting that the coefficient of Rating dummy is significantly negative. The 
rating of borrowers is given by a third independent agency from guarantors and banks. 
My results suggest that firms with a rating obtain lower loan rates. As suggested by a 
guarantor officer that they know little about the creditability of the rating and rarely take 
it into consideration in setting rates of guarantee fee, it is therefore not surprising to find 
that the rating does not affect default probability measure given by guarantors.  
 
B. Banks’ Information Advantage 
       Empirical results indicate that guarantors incorporate soft information when making 
guarantee decisions, while banks rely more on public information and ratings. I also find 
evidence that it is the additional part of information banks have than guarantors that 
contributes to predictability of loan default. Table IX presents the results. Bank private 
information is the residual taken from the regression of loan rates on rates of guarantee 
                                                  
8 I would like to thank Maggie Chen for useful explanations of the practical details for guarantors’ daily 
operation.  
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fee. The positive coefficients of bank private information suggest that banks have more 
useful information in setting loan rates than guarantors. A possible explanation is that 
although guarantors have advantage over banks in terms of analyzing borrowers’ credit 
risk by utilizing soft information, banks may have overwhelming advantage in collecting 
and analyzing hard information about borrowers. People’s bank of China has been 
constructing an internal credit system, recording borrowers’ credit history and loan 
performance. It is serving as an important source of information that banks rely on when 
determining loan amount and charge rate. Significant coefficients of loan rates suggest 
banks price loans more effectively. 
 
C. A Test of Borrower Lying Behavior 
       As discussed in earlier in the hypothesis development in Section II, borrowers have 
incentives to lie about their real operation or credit condition, or hide bad information 
from the guarantors or banks. If bad borrowers have such incentives to lie, we would 
expect a predictive power of lying behavior on loan defaults. To test it, I regress book 
value of shareholder equity on major proxies for firm size, profitability and liquidity, and 
take the residual as a measure for the lying behavior. It shows in the specification as the 
abnormal book value of shareholder equity. The empirical results are presented in Table 
VIII.  
 
       Table VIII show that abnormal book value of shareholder equity is positively 
associated with the loan default dummy, after controlling for firm characteristics, 
guarantor private information and guarantor officer characteristics, and including year 
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and industry fixed effects. This evidence provides strong support to the conjecture that 
borrowers have incentives to lie, and neither guarantors nor banks can detect borrowers’ 
manipulation of financial data.  
 
 
VII. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
       In this paper I analyze the disagreement between loan guarantors and banks in 
pricing loans, and the predictive power of loan rates and the rate of guarantee fee on loan 
default. I obtain two main results. First, guarantors and banks give conflicting default 
probability of loans by using different sources of information. Second, loan rates better 
predict loan default. The result is consistent with the predictions of the model in an 
asymmetric information setting. 
       I start the analysis by examining the pricing of loan guarantee. The rate of guarantee 
fee is mainly determined by the default probability measure, which is calculated by 
guarantor officers after investigating the borrowers’ credit condition. Loans of larger size 
are often given higher default probability measure. Guarantee applications with higher 
default probability measure are more likely to see a reduction in the final approved 
guaranteed amount. The above analysis provides an overall picture of how a loan 
guarantee is processed.  
       My findings complement the bank lending literature, which mainly focus on banks’ 
information advantage over other outsiders. This work is most closely related to the 
growing literature discussing the role of soft information used by Chinese commercial 
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banks (Qian, Strahan and Yang (2010), Chang, Liao, Yu and Ni (2010), etc). Different 
from their perspective, I analyze the role of guarantors as a private bureau in alleviating 
information asymmetry in bank lending to small business. I focus on information 
conflicts between guarantors and banks. This paper also contributes to the growing 
literature on formal and informal finance. Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2010) question whether reputation and relationship based financing are responsible for 
the performance of the fastest-growing firms in developing countries. Consistent with 
their findings, my results have implications that informal finance is likely to be limited.  
       My findings have important policy implications. First, my results reveal the 
imperfection in information process for lending decisions. Information asymmetry among 
borrowers, guarantors and banks increase the borrowing cost for small business. The 
existence of guarantors as an intermediation facilitates the screening of loans to SMEs, 
but guarantors have no information advantage over banks. My findings question the 
contribution of soft information collected by guarantors in assessing loan risk and support 
the literature questioning the role of informal finance in China.  
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Table I 
Summary Statistics of Guaranteed Loans and Loan Defaults 
This Table reports the summary of guaranteed loan characteristics by year and by lending 
banks. See Appendix I for variable definitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Summary of Loans and Defaults 
Year of  Approval 
No. of 
Loans 
No. of 
Loan 
Defaults 
Default 
Probability 
Measure 
Loan 
Rate 
Rate of 
Guarantee 
Fee Default Rate 
2006 247 1 0.598 6.845 1.906 0.40% 
2007 359 12 0.500 7.465 1.735 3.34% 
2008 310 3 0.432 7.635 1.668 0.97% 
2009 H1 160 0 0.459 5.625 1.473 0.00% 
Total 1076 16 0.496 7.182 1.715 1.49% 
       
       
Panel B. Summary of Loans and Defaults - State-owned Bank 
Year of  Approval 
No. of 
Loans 
No. of 
Loan 
Defaults 
Default 
Probability 
Measure 
Loan 
Rate 
Rate of 
Guarantee 
Fee Default Rate 
2006 31 0 0.581 6.834 2.032 0.00% 
2007 65 3 0.519 7.823 2.029 4.62% 
2008 52 1 0.438 7.803 1.962 1.92% 
2009 H1 30 0 0.454 5.856 1.868 0.00% 
Total 178 4 0.494 7.388 1.982 2.25% 
       
       
Panel C. Summary of Loans and Defaults - Non-state-owned Bank 
Year of  Approval 
No. of 
Loans 
No. of 
Loan 
Defaults 
Default 
Probability 
Measure 
Loan 
Rate 
Rate of 
Guarantee 
Fee Default Rate 
2006 182 1 0.600 7.072 1.890 0.55% 
2007 289 8 0.494 7.369 1.669 2.77% 
2008 254 2 0.431 7.586 1.624 0.79% 
2009 H1 127 0 0.458 5.543 1.365 0.00% 
Total 852 11 0.492 7.147 1.657 1.29% 
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Panel D. No. of Loans and Defaults by Banks 
Bank 
No. of  
Loans 
No. of 
Defaults 
Default 
Rate 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 37 0 0.00% 
China Everbright Bank 4 0 0.00% 
Guangdong Development Bank 29 0 0.00% 
China Development Bank 5 0 0.00% 
Huaxia Bank 122 3 2.46% 
China Construction Bank 123 4 3.25% 
Bank of Communications 31 1 3.23% 
China Minsheng Bank 8 0 0.00% 
Shenzhen Ping An Bank 454 6 1.32% 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 88 1 1.14% 
Shenzhen Development Bank 35 0 0.00% 
Industrial Bank 64 0 0.00% 
China Merchants Bank 14 0 0.00% 
Bank of China 13 0 0.00% 
Other Banks 46 1 2.17% 
Total 1076 16 1.49% 
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Table II 
Borrowing Firms’ Characteristics and Correlation Analysis 
This table reports borrowing firms’ characteristics and correlation between variables. 
Accounting data are extracted one year before the year when a loan guarantee is approved. 
Firms without total asset, sales or cash data are excluded from the sample. Variables in Panel 
B are: (1) Default; (2) Default Probability Measure; (3) Rate of Guarantee Fee; (4) Credit 
Score; (5) Size; (6) Leverage; (7) ROA; (8) Asset Turnover; (9) Sales Growth. See Appendix I 
for variable definitions. ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Borrowing Firms' Characteristics 
Variable Min Max Mean StdDev N 
Total Asset 3.604 1056.700 70.969 107.787 776 
Sales 0.530 1482.560 97.318 142.596 776 
Leverage 0.000 0.909 0.354 0.169 776 
Cash 2.000 18625.000 659.871 1448.065 776 
ROA -28.690 143.000 19.067 13.044 773 
No. of Employee 10.000 3600.000 325.162 410.391 776 
Asset Turnover 0.008 12.397 1.655 1.209 776 
Sales Growth -3.754 4.949 -0.005 1.482 764 
Credit Score 37.000 90.000 67.777 9.072 774 
Default Probability Measure 0.180 1.300 0.492 0.154 774 
Rate of Guarantee Fee 0.000 4.400 1.753 0.785 776 
 
 
Panel B. Correlation Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(2) 0.009        
(3) -0.040 0.175***       
(4) 0.011 -0.459*** -0.052      
(5) -0.033 0.071 -0.197*** -0.057     
(6) 0.026 0.143*** -0.032 -0.301*** 0.252***    
(7) 0.008 -0.191 0.027 0.404*** -0.320*** -0.226***   
(8) 0.081* -0.138*** -0.025 0.052 -0.204*** 0.059 0.250***  
(9) 0.019 0.032 -0.135*** 0.010 0.520*** 0.186*** -0.097** 0.254*** 
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Table III 
Disagreement between Guarantor and Banks in Pricing Loans 
This table reports the OLS regression results for Loan Rate. The dependent variable is Loan 
Rate. Loans with zero loan rates are excluded from the sample. Model 2 to 4 are estimated 
with fixed year and industry effect controls. Values in parentheses are standard errors. See 
Appendix I for variable definitions. ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Default Probability Measure -1.5940 -0.7391 -1.4158 -1.3570 
 (0.35)*** (0.28)*** (0.33)*** (0.33)*** 
State-owned Bank  0.3367 0.3526 0.3653 
  (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** 
Crisis  1.2352 1.0433 0.3653 
  (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** 
Borrower Characteristics     
Firm Age   -0.0025 0.0006 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Book Value of Shareholder Equity   0.0102 -0.0014 
   (0.03) (-0.05) 
Value of Collateral/Amount of Loan   0.7467 0.7252 
   (0.28)*** (0.28)*** 
Credit History     
Rating    -0.1671 
    (0.08)** 
Loan History    0.0307 
    (0.08) 
Present Loan    (-0.52) 
    0.0018 
Intercept 7.8830 935.181 1031.60 991.023 
 (0.17)*** (85.78)*** (96.35)*** (98.30)*** 
Year Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square (%) 3.1 44.71 43.12 43.63 
No. of Observations 610 605 439 438 
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Table IV 
Determinants of Rate of Guarantee Fee 
This table reports the OLS regression for the determinants of Rate of Guarantee Fee. The 
dependent variable is the Default dummy. Model 2 to 5 are estimated with year and industry 
fixed effect controls. Loan guarantees with zero rate of guarantee fee are excluded from the 
sample. Values in parentheses are standard errors. See Appendix I for variable definitions. 
***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Default Probability Measure 0.3285 0.2476 0.2360 0.2372 0.2464 
 (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (2.97)*** (0.08)*** 
Borrower Characteristics      
Firm Age  -0.0076 -0.0072 -0.0080 -0.0076 
  (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00)** 
No. of Shareholders  -0.0007 -0.0440 -0.0007 -0.0005 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Book Value of Shareholder Equity  -0.0073 -0.0111 -0.0119 -0.0112 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Value of Collateral/Amount of Loan  -0.1006 -0.0888 -0.0929 -0.0978 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Credit History      
Rating   0.0494 0.0482 0.0468 
   (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)* 
Previous Loan   0.0202 0.0065 0.0060 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Present Loan   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Guarantor's Private Information      
Guaranty History    0.0266 0.0319 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
Relatives    -0.0192 -0.0270 
    (0.02) (0.02) 
Political Background    -0.0122 -0.0142 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
Guarantor Characteristics      
Low Capability     0.0264 
     (0.05) 
Higher Diploma     0.1217 
     (0.03)*** 
Intercept 1.8904 90.3186 98.2573 102.230 114.596 
 (0.03)*** (25.55)*** (25.83)*** (26.83)*** (27.20)*** 
Year Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square (%) 5.13 5.08 5.49 5.33 6.80 
No. of Observations 889 660 660 660 660 
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Table V 
Determinants of Guaranteed Amount 
This table reports the regression results for the determinants of guaranteed amount. The 
dependent variables from model 1, 2and 3 are raw guaranteed amount; the dependent 
variables from model 3 to 6 are: guaranteed amount scaled by total asset. Model 2, 3, 5, and 
6 are estimated with year and industry fixed effect controls. Values in parentheses are 
standard errors. See Appendix I for variable definitions. ***, **, and * mean significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
Default Probability Measure 561.204 -72.025 -63.462 -0.0862 0.0014 0.0062 
 (129.45)** (36.05)** (36.34)* (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
Application Amount 0.9372 0.9337  0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.01)*** (0.01)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Borrower Characteristics      
Firm Age  0.7167 0.7138  -0.0036 -0.0031 
  (1.36) (1.37)  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
No. of Shareholders 0.2377 0.1536  -0.0017 -0.0016 
  (0.98) (0.98)  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Book Value of Shareholder Equity 4.8472 7.1398  0.0272 0.0264 
  (4.43) (4.53)  (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
Value of Collateral 0.0054 0.0058  0.3285 0.3292 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Credit History      
Rating   -0.1541   0.0004 
   (11.59)   (0.01) 
Previous Loan  8.4489   -0.0143 
   (13.66)   (0.01)* 
Present Loan  -0.0000   -0.0000 
   (0.00)*   (0.00)* 
Guarantors' Private Information     
Guaranty History  -22.269   -0.0160 
   (13.03)*   (0.01)** 
Relatives   25.3150   -0.0061 
   (10.94)**   (0.01) 
Political Background  2.6724   0.0016 
   (12.60)   (0.01) 
Guarantor Characteristics     
Low Capability  40.8512   -0.0133 
   (20.94)*   (0.01) 
Higher Diploma  -0.0363   -0.0050 
   (0.04)   (0.01) 
Intercept 249.907 -4578.1 -7387.4 0.1744 5.525f6 3.2992 
 (67.57)*** (11334.02) (12080.00) (0.04)*** (6.85) (7.38) 
Year Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square (%) 1.65 93.59 93.63 4.04 35.37 36.51 
No. of Observations 1064 1057 1056 784 778 778 
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Table VI 
Loan Rate and Loan Default 
This table reports the probit regression results. The dependent variable is the Default dummy. Model 1, 2, 6, and 7 are estimated with the 
sample which exclude loans with zero guarantee fee or zero loan rate. Model 3 to 5 are estimated with the full sample. Included in the 
regressions but not shown in the table are variables indicating borrower characteristics and loan characteristics. Models are estimated with 
year and industry fixed effect controls. Values in parentheses are standard errors. See Appendix I for variable definitions. ***, **, and * 
mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
Loan Rate 0.4838     0.5660  
 (0.22)**     (0.23)**  
All Information  0.4549     0.5413 
  (0.21)**     (0.23)** 
Guaranty History   -0.5689   -0.4085 -0.4363 
   (0.26)**   (0.43) (0.43) 
Firm Age    -0.1176  -0.1485 -0.1438 
    (0.05)**  (0.07)** (0.07)** 
Low Capability     1.1041 0.8846 0.8977 
     (0.33)*** (0.48)* (0.48)* 
Intercept 504.427 456.498 56.9867 13.1370 -1.5104 -33.540 -70.243 
 (599.50) (581.56) (278.87) (285.19) (1.57) (751.24) (731.28) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
McFadden's R-square (%) 0.02 1.69 2.52 2.16 0.11 2.49 5.44 
Wald Chi-square 0.78 8.07 12.76 12.13 16.44 12.00 617 
Accuracy Ratio (%) 42.33 40.76 49.38 41.80 10.68 68.02 67.08 
No. of Observations 612 612 770 770 770 612 612 
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Table VII 
Loan Rate and Loan Default – Subsample Analysis 
This table reports the probit regression results. Values in parentheses are standard errors. Included in the regressions but not shown in the 
table are variables indicating borrower characteristics and loan characteristics. Models are estimated with year and industry fixed effect 
controls. See Appendix I for variable definitions. ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  Type of Banks   Guaranty History 
 State-owned Non-state-owned  Yes No 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4   Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
Loan Rate 0.3310  0.1271   0.2020  0.4029  
 (0.15)**  (0.17)   (0.28)  (0.18)**  
All Information  0.7315  0.0624   0.2430  0.3094 
  (0.34)**  (0.16)   (0.30)  (0.17)* 
Intercept 578.488 808.954 429.236 424.413  305.593 309.571 405.756 381.100 
 (435.61) (1063.58) (433.07) (413.36)  (742.08) (768.90) (601.94) (557.35) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes        Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
McFadden's R-square (%) 2.48 2.48 2.67 0.17  0.31 0.14 0.09 0.92 
Wald Chi-square 4.38** 5.55 0.23 2.49  0.69 3.06 3.77** 6.07 
No. of Observations 141 140 467 463  281 280 331 327 
No. of Defaults 6 10 6 10   3 3 13 13 
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Table VIII 
Information Advantage of Banks and Loan Default 
This table reports the probit regression results. Bank Private Information is the residual 
taken from the regression of loan rate on rate of guarantee fee. Models are estimated with 
year and industry fixed effect controls. See Appendix I for variable definitions. ***, **, and * 
mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 
Bank Private Information 0.3444 0.3643 0.5647 
 (0.15)** (0.15)** (0.23)** 
Guaranty History  0.3643 -0.3980 
  (0.15)** (0.43) 
Firm Age  -0.0720 -0.1497 
  (0.04) (0.07)** 
Low Capability  0.4590 0.8791 
  (0.38) (0.48)* 
Size   0.1125 
   (0.30) 
ROA   -0.0116 
   (0.02) 
Leverage   0.3833 
   (1.18) 
Cash   1.7605 
   (2.19) 
Sales Growth   0.0003 
   (0.16) 
Asset Turnover   0.1235 
   (0.11) 
Log (Book Value of Shareholder Equity)   0.0291 
   (0.19) 
Value of Collateral/Amount of Loan   -0.9402 
   (1.59) 
No. of Shareholders   0.0004 
   (0.03) 
Intercept 593.015 312.873 -20.921 
 (441.54) (487.76) (752.15) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
McFadden's R-square (%) 0.17 1.00 1.74 
Wald Chi-square 7.82** 13.40** 13.18** 
No. of Observations 612 612 612 
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Table IX 
Information Content of Rate of Guarantee Fee and Loan Rate 
This table reports the OLS regression results for rate of guarantee fee, default probability 
measure and loan rate. Models are estimated with year and industry fixed effect controls. See 
Appendix I for variable definitions. ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Rate of 
Guarantee Fee 
Default 
Probability 
Measure Loan Rate 
Borrower Characteristics    
Size -0.0590 -0.0036 -0.2660 
 (0.02)*** (0.01) (0.08)*** 
ROA -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0050 
 (0.00) (0.00)*** (0.00) 
Leverage 0.0062 0.0791 -0.3384 
 (0.07) (0.04)** (0.31) 
Cash 0.1030 -0.0335 0.7650 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.67) 
Sales Growth   -0.0026 0.0031 0.0338 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) 
Asset Turnover -0.0101 -0.0110 0.0575 
 (0.01) (0.00)** (0.04) 
Firm Age -0.0023 0.0013 0.0037 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
No. of Shareholders -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0028 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Book Value of Shareholder Equity 0.0073 -0.0055 0.1392 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)*** 
Value of Collateral -0.0356 -0.0235 0.1247 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.13) 
Credit History    
Rating 0.0103 0.0175 -0.3842 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.10)*** 
Previous Loan 0.0263 0.0000 0.1662 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.10) 
Present Loan -0.0000  0.0000 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Guarantor's Private Information    
Guaranty History  -0.0042  
  (0.01)  
Relatives  -0.0009  
  (0.01)  
Political Background  -0.0236  
  (0.01)**  
Intercept 2.4822 0.5224 8.4806 
  (0.14)*** (0.07)*** (0.62)*** 
Adjusted R-square (%) 7.82** 13.40** 13.18** 
No. of Observations 612 612 612 
Whether the Residual can Predict Default?  No No Yes 
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Table X 
Can Abnormal Book Value of Shareholder Equity Predict Loan Default? 
This table reports the OLS regression results showing the predictive power of abnormal 
book value of shareholder equity. The Dependent variable is the Default dummy. Abnormal 
Book Value of Shareholder Equity is the residual taken from the regression of raw Book 
Value of Shareholder on hard information measures (ROA, Sales, leverage Cash, Asset 
Turnover and Sales Growth Rate). Models are estimated with year and industry fixed effect 
controls. See Appendix I for variable definitions. ***, **, and * mean significant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 
Abnormal Book Value of Shareholder Equity 0.4938 0.5926 0.6792 
 (0.25)*** (0.26)** (0.31)** 
Loan History  -0.7945 -1.0961 
  (0.34)** (0.47)** 
Firm Age  -0.1543 -0.1771 
  (0.06)** (0.07)** 
Low capability  0.9577 1.0334 
  (0.44)** (0.48)** 
Political Background   0.6639 
   (0.34)* 
Relatives   -0.2516 
   (0.36) 
Value of Collateral/Amount of Loan   -1.4114 
   (2.18) 
No. of Shareholders   -0.0328 
   (0.07) 
State-owned Bank   0.3600 
   (0.36) 
Intercept -2.2398 -1.2046 -1.1883 
  (0.13)*** (0.32)*** (0.45)*** 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi-square 3.82* 15.62*** 17.53* 
Observations 658 657 624 
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Figure1.  Guaranty Fee and Default Probability Measure 
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Figure2.  Loan Rate and Guaranty Fee 
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Figure3.  Loan Rate and Default Probability Measure 
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Figure4.  Credit Score and Default Probability Measure 
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Appendix I 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definition Measure as of Year 
Default        
A dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm defaults on its short-term loans, and 
equals zero otherwise. Default occurs if a 
firm fails to repay any of the installments. 
This variable is measured within 
one year or two years after the 
loan is originated.  
Default Probability Measure 
Guarantee firm's internal credit risk 
measure. The score is between 0 and 1. 
The higher the score is, the riskier the 
short-term loan is.  
 
Guaranty History 
A dummy variable that equals to one if a 
firm was guaranteed by the same 
guarantor before, and equals to zero if 
not.  
 
Loan History 
A dummy variable that equals to one if a 
firm was granted loans before, and equals 
to zero if not.  
 
No. of Loans 
The number of loans the borrowing firm 
has already had until the application of the 
new loan.  
 
Rate of Guarantee Fee Percentage rate of credit guarantee fee 
charged by the guarantee firm.  
 
Qualitative Score 
A score given by the guarantee firm. The 
calculation is based on the borrower's 
qualitative variables (The manager's ability, 
the firm's reputation, etc). 
 
Quantitative Score 
A score given by the guarantee firm. The 
Calculation is based on the borrower's 
quantitative variables (The firm's 
profitability, sales, etc). 
 
Credit Score The sum of qualitative score and 
quantitative score.  
 
Firm Age 
No. of years from the date of foundation 
of a borrowing firm to its date of loan 
application.  
These variables are measured at 
one year before the year when 
the loan was approved.  
Size The natural log of book value of total 
assets at the end of the year. 
Leverage 
Financial leverage, calculated as total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the end 
of the year.  
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income 
divided by total assets.  
Asset Turnover Asset turnover ratio, calculated as total 
sales divided by total assets.  
Sales Growth The natural log of the division of sales of 
current year by that of previous year.  
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Relatives 
A dummy variable that equals one if the 
borrowing firm's manager's relatives are 
working in the firm, and equals to zero if 
not.  
 
Political Background 
A dummy variable that equals one if the 
borrowing firm's manager has political 
background, and equals zero if not.  
 
Low capacity 
A dummy variable that equals one if the 
project manager in the guarantee firm had 
worked for 8 years or more at the year of 
loan application he/she was in charge of.  
This variable is measured at the 
year when the loan was 
approved. 
Higher Degree 
A dummy variable that equals one if the 
project manager in the gurantee firm has 
master's or doctor's degree.  
 
State-owned Bank 
A dummy variable that equals one if the 
loan-issuing bank is state-owned, and 
equals zero if not.  
 
Crisis 
A dummy variable that equals one if the 
loan was approved between July 2007 and 
June 2009, and equals zero if the loan was 
approved before July 2007.  
  
Application Amount The amount of the loan guarantees that 
the borrower applied for to a guarantor.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
